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Each of us has written about the importance of reframing the debate over public health paternalism.1 Our individual explorations of 
the many and varied paths forward from libertarian 
“nanny state” objections to the “new public health” 
have been intimately informed by collaboration.2 This 
article represents a summary of our current thinking 
— reflecting the ground gained through many fruitful 
exchanges and charting future collaborative efforts. 
Our starting point is that law is a vitally important 
determinant of population health, and the interplay 
among law, social norms, cultural beliefs, health behav-
iors, and healthy living conditions is complex. Anti-
paternalists’ efforts to limit the scope of public health 
law to controlling only the proximal determinants of 
infectious diseases are utterly unjustifiable in the face 
of so much preventable death, disability, and dispar-
ity. Equally important, the anti-paternalism push 
is deeply counter-majoritarian and undemocratic, 
threatening to disable communities from undertaking 
measures to improve their own well-being.
Although it may be tempting, we decline to dismiss 
the “nanny state” slur solely on the grounds that “per-
sonal responsibility” and the purported “freedom to 
choose” unhealthy products are smoke and mirrors 
designed to hide the profit motive of industry groups 
and their supporters. Certainly, regulated industries 
have invested a great deal in framing the public’s 
response to public health measures. But we cannot 
ignore the merits and potency of some of the criti-
cism pointed at public health. At times, public health 
has over-reached, failing to consider the full range 
of concerns and values of the public it seeks to pro-
tect. We must, therefore, recognize that communities 
may rightly weigh ends other than health more highly 
than public health experts would, and also that the 
anti-paternalistic rhetoric resonates with deeply held 
beliefs about the relationship between the govern-
ment and its citizens in a pluralistic society.
Even so, this rhetoric must be seen as part of a 
broader attack by libertarian legal scholars and indus-
try groups on regulation in general, and the new pub-
lic health in particular.3 It is percolating into industry-
sponsored legal filings and even judicial opinions. It 
threatens to erode the legal foundation for good public 
health practice. To counteract these developments, we 
must articulate a coherent, principled response that 
reframes the debate on our own terms, rather than 
remaining on the defensive. We must proactively 
scan the horizon for the legal and political debates of 
tomorrow, rather than being caught off guard.
Responses
In responding to allegations of nanny-statism, we 
need to be clear about the weak legal basis for the lib-
ertarian objection. Otherwise, our counter-arguments 
threaten to reify a vague, but growing sense among the 
general public that interventions like the New York 
City portion rule or the health insurance mandate are 
being struck down by courts in the name of individual 
rights. 
Despite the objections of so-called constitutional 
libertarians who seek to “recover” a constitution that 
never was,4 it is, in fact, well established that states 
have a legitimate interest in protecting the health 
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and safety of the people, even from threats associ-
ated with individuals’ own choices and actions.5 
Anti-paternalism does not provide a constitutionally 
enshrined, counter-majoritarian restraint on gov-
ernmental authority. Likewise, despite a narrowing 
of the scope of the federal government’s authority 
under the Commerce Clause in NFIB v. Sebelius,6 
it remains the case that the federal government can 
use its enumerated constitutional powers, including 
its authority to tax and spend, to protect health and 
safety. In cases where the courts must apply strict 
scrutiny because a fundamental right (such as free-
dom of speech) or suspect classification (e.g., race or 
religion) is implicated, a purely paternalistic govern-
mental interest may not be sufficiently compelling 
to justify infringement.7 But there is no fundamental 
right to sell or purchase particular products or ser-
vices in particular configurations.8 
Even the recent New York Court of Appeals opin-
ion invalidating the portion rule, which undoubtedly 
contained a nod to the libertarian critique of public 
health, did not reject the city’s authority to regulate 
portion sizes. Instead, the court determined that the 
legislature, not the health department, should make 
the decision.9 Were such a rule to be adopted by a 
legislative body, the philosophical anti-paternalism 
argument would not be sufficient to justify a coun-
ter-majoritarian constraint on legislative action. We 
should be careful to specify that the debate over pub-
lic health paternalism is not about what government 
may do, but rather what government should do.
Part of the difficulty in responding to anti-paternal-
ism arises from the fact that the libertarian objection 
does not confine itself to coercive paternalistic regula-
tions. It is a constantly shifting attack on regulation 
of all kinds. Many of the targeted regulations create 
inconvenience or require the payment of small fines, 
but do not involve significant restraints on individual 
liberty. Others regulate the behavior of manufacturers 
or sellers for the good of consumers, rather than regu-
lating consumers for their own good. New York City’s 
menu labeling and portion rules regulate how sellers 
sell, not what patrons can eat or drink. In essence, 
these laws are similar to prohibitions on the sale of 
unwholesome food or dangerous drugs. While some 
may disagree with the need for such laws, they are 
no more paternalistic than laws that prevent people 
from assaulting others. Those who are protected by 
such laws could theoretically engage in self-help; the 
fact that laws reduce their need to do so by regulating 
those who would endanger them does not make the 
laws unduly paternalistic. 
Reframings
We need to recast public health law, both in percep-
tion and reality, from regulations imposed by out-of-
touch bureaucrats to the actions that communities 
undertake to ensure the conditions in which they can 
be healthy. Although expertise can and should play 
an important role in informing public health protec-
tions, public health law is most legitimate and secure 
when it reflects the concerns and values of affected 
populations, and emerges from their engagement, as 
occurred when the gay community mobilized around 
HIV in the 1980s and ‘90s, or when African-American 
and Latino communities mobilize around the issue of 
access to healthy food. When directed at such pub-
lic health laws, the libertarian critique is exposed for 
what it is: an attack on the liberty of communities to 
improve their own health. 
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Scanning the Horizon
In addition to responding to the libertarian objection 
and reframing the debate over public health regula-
tion, public health must be more proactive in identi-
fying and immediately confronting legal and political 
challenges to public health. These include the devel-
opment of preemption, non-delegation, First Amend-
ment, Equal Protection, and Due Process doctrines 
as barriers to commercial regulation, as well as the 
development of progressive (and not merely libertar-
ian) objections to public health regulation. 
Civil liberties, including free speech, have intrin-
sic value for progressives. Additionally, they play an 
important role in promoting public health. Indeed, we 
should remember that public health advocates have 
supported robust interpretations of the First Amend-
ment in their battles against governmental limitations 
on speech concerning HIV/AIDS or gun ownership.10 
Even as we object to the use of civil liberties to protect 
industry interests from regulation, we need to recog-
nize that First Amendment, Equal Protection, and 
Due Process claims are not trivial; sometimes they 
are critical to securing health.11 We need to articulate 
principles that are supportive of appropriate public 
health regulations while also being respectful of con-
stitutional protections and are firmly rooted in public 
health’s democratic roots.
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